Military Adaptation and Organisational Convergence: Insurgents and International Forces in Afghanistan

Professor Theo Farrell, Wollongong University

Existing studies on military adaptation focus on explaining difference; namely, why, when and how militaries adapt in different ways to the challenges of war. However, Organisation theory suggests that competition and normative pressure will lead overtime to convergence within particular business and policy sectors, as optimal ways of organizing and operating are learned and emulated. I examine this dynamic in the context of war, and specifically the conflict between the Afghan Taliban and the British Army in Helmand Province, between 2006 and 2010. That there should be convergence in modes of operation or organizational form between these two very different opponents seems most improbable. Yet, as this article shows, convergence did occur as the conflict wore on. First, both sides paid increasing attention to winning the consent of the local population, and this impacted on how they conducted operations. Second, both sides sought to develop more centralized command and control of their respective campaigns, and this impacted on organizational structures and routines.

Professor Theo Farrell is Deputy Vice-Chancellor (Education) at the University of Wollongong in Australia. He was previously Professor of War in the Modern World and Head of Department of War Studies at King’s College London, and President of the British International Studies Association. His latest book, Unwinnable: Britain’s War in Afghanistan (London: Viking, 2018), was shortlisted for three national awards and selected book of the year by The Sunday Times.